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Trump, federalism and the punishment of sanctuary cities
istorically, liberals have tended
to hold more expansive under
standings of the scope of fed
eral power.
Conservatives, on the other hand,
have tended to embrace stronger the
ories of federalism - the term we use
to describe the reservation of govern
ment power to state and local govern
ments under the Constitution.
The 10th Amendment captures the
essence of our federalism: "The pow
ers not delegated to the United States
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by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
Consider the recent debates over
the constitutionality of the Affordable
Care Act, also known as Obarnacare.
Many liberals defended Obamacare
as a perfectly appropriate exercise of
federal power to solve a national
problem. Many conservatives, in con
trast, saw Obamacare as a vast fed
eral overreach. These positions typi
fied the usual positions of liberals and

conservatives on major federal social
programs.
Now, consider the emerging de
bate over the vigorous enforcement of
the nation's immigration laws
promised by the 'frump administra
tion. In this new context, the tradi
tional positions of liberals and conser
vatives with respect to federalism
have been turned on their heads.
On Jan, 25, President Donald
SEE CONSTITUTION 06

Sanctuary cities cases could lead to important new federalism rulings
CONSTITUTION FROM D1

the federal government.
The success of these argu
Trump issued an executive or ments will likely depend on
der directing that federal
how courts apply two
funds be withheld from so
Supreme Court federalism
called "sanctuary cities."
precedents created in the
context of conservative chal
Sanctuary cities, which are
lenges to liberal federal regu
typically controlled by rela
latory programs.
tively liberal political forces,
'l'he first precedent arose
limit their cooperation with
the federal government in en from the fight over Oba
macare. Recall that, after
forcing national immigration
laws as a matter of local pol
Obamacare was enacted, a
icy.
number of states sued to halt
In response to the execu
its implementation. While the
Supreme Court upheld the
tive order, a number of sanc
core of statute against consti
tuary cities filed lawsuits
challenging its constitutional tutional challenge, the law
ity, These lawsuits assert a
suits succeeded in part.
In 2012, in National Feder
number of theories, but place
two arguments front and cen ation ofIndependent Busi
ness v. Sebelius, the Supreme
ter.
First, the order coerces the Court held that Congress
cities to participate in a fed
could not coerce a state to ac
eral law program from which cept Obamacare's Medicaid
they are constitutionally enti expansion provisions by con
tled to abstain. Second, the or ditioning all of the state's fu
der impermissibly comman
ture Medicaid funding on its
acquiescence to the new pro
deers local authorities to
serve as unwilling agents of
visions. Writing for a 7-2 court

majority, Chief Justice John
Roberts described these pro
visions as a gun to the head of
the states.
While Congress has wide
latitude to impose conditions
on federal funds made avail
able to state and local govern
ments, Roberts wrote, it can
not use its spending power to
coerce state and local govern
ments to participate in a fed
eral regulatory program.
By threatening to withhold
all of a state's Medicaid fund
ing if the state did not accept
the Medicaid expansion,
Congress was effectively mak
ing the states an offer that
they could not refuse. Feder
alism does not permit this.
The second precedent
arose from litigation over pro
visions of a 1993 federal gun
control statute named for
James Brady, President
Ronald Reagan's press secre
tary who was badly wounded
in a 1981 assassination at
tempt on the president.

The "Brady Bill" sought to
prevent the sale of guns to
persons who are barred by
law from owning them be
cause of, for example, their
criminal history.
In furtherance of this ob
jective, the Brady Bill autho
rized development of a federal
database that would be used
to determine whether poten
tial purchasers were indeed
eligible to buy guns. But be
cause constructing the
database would take several
years, the law also contained
interim provisions requiring
local law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks
in connection with proposed
gun sales until the database
was completed.
Two local sheriffs who ob
jected to being temporarily
commandeered into federal
service under the Brady Bill
brought lawsuits claiming
that these interim provisions
violated the Constitution. And
they won.

ing federal funds to force
sanctuary. cities to cooperate
held that the commandeering with federal immigration au
of local law enforcement offi
thorities unconstitutionally
coerce and commandeer local
cials worked by the Brady
Bill's interim provisions is not officials in violation of the
permitted under our federal
lOthe Amendment?
Federalism experts are di
ist structure of government,
as described in the 10th
vided on these questions, and
the courts entertaining law
Amendment.
Writing for a 5-4 majority,
suits by sanctuary cities may
Justice Antonin Scalia stated well split over them, too.
Perhaps these cases will
that such legislation could
blur lines of political account make their way to the
Supreme Court and give rise
ability, as voters who do not
to important new federalism
want their local elected offi
rulings. In any event, it is not
cials doing federal back
ground checks might not real too early to take note of how
these cases illustrate that fed
ize that the officials were
obliged to do so under federal eralism is not only the domain
law. Also, upholding such leg of conservatives.
islation would invite the fed
(John Greabe teaches con
eral government to treat state
stitutional law and related
governments as its subordi
nate agents instead of as sep subjects at the University of
arate sovereigns.
New Hampshire School of
So do these precedents
Law. He also serves on the
spell the doom of Trump's ex board oftrustees of the New
ecutive order targeting sanc Hampshire Institute for
Civics Education.)
tuary cities? Does withhold

In 1997, in Printz v. United
States, the Supreme Court

